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Abstract
Sharing information with others is always a choice. In the world of
cyber defense, sharing information with others can help others defend
themselves, and with this increase the joint defense our society needs
to have in order to stay safe. Several factors influences the choice of
sharing valuable cyber threat intelligence, and the ethical considerations
are argued to be a prominent part of this.
When encountering a situation where a choice of sharing information
is emerging, the choice will be twofold: 1. what information should
be shared?, and 2. with whom should the information be shared?
The ethical challenges of the choices is primarily tied to who you have
obligations to. The consequences of the choices will potentially affect the
society in variable degrees, your employer, your colleagues, your friends
and obviously yourself.
This article discusses the ethical considerations cyber security
personnel is facing making these types of decisions.
The first part of the article explains details of cyber threat intelligence
and its community architecture. Following this, the article describes
what influences the choice personnel is facing when having the possibility
to share valuable information with others, tying the considerations to
known research within knowledge management and ethics of knowledge
sharing. An example is given to discuss the possible choices and
the ethical considerations within all possible choices. Towards the
end a short note is done on sharing information in the aftermath of
incidents instead of during an incident. The articles concludes that not
sharing valuable information at all is immoral, but how much and with
whom needs to be a consideration made special in each case, leaving a
deontological approach unsuitable.
1 Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber infrastructure encompasses many aspects of our daily lives. Our homes are an
increasing part of the 'Internet of Things', our society is increasingly digitalized and
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our workplaces are all, to some degree, using available cloud services as convenient
and efficient solutions for us to perform at our best. Everything connected to the
internet is made available to the rest of the world. The rest of the world are not
always having only good intentions. Everything available on the internet makes
possible targets for cyber threats1, and the consequences are possibly lethal; physical
damage to for example a dam or a nuclear power plant could kill numerous people
and provide environmental changes beyond repair within our lifetime. Defending
ourselves has never been more important, and will be increasingly important in the
years to come.
Cyber-attacks are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging. The
stories of Stuxnet, the 2016 US Election and the more recent ransomware WannaCry
reveals the concerning fact that highly skilled threat agents are capable of sabotage,
espionage and subversion to the degree of nation state concern. Some argue there is
no such thing as cyber warfare[1], but in July 2016 NATO recognized cyberspace as
a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in
the air, on land and at sea[2]. The terminology used may not be as interesting as the
discussion revealing capabilities and consequences of conflict in the field of cyber.
Recent history shows us that critical infrastructure can be taken down, elections
may be influenced and critical parts of society can be disrupted for days caused by
attacks happening in cyber space alone.
The need for advanced and rapid response is increasing. Seeing the battlefield
is far less visual than that of physical war, the need for sharing and communicating
known intelligence between defending partners increase. Sharing information and
knowledge is a field of its own. A field where technical and strategic obstacles are
discussed and debated, but where I would argue that ethical considerations are just
as important to address.
Cyber threat intelligence started out as something the larger and best computer
incident response environments did to succeed in their day to day job. Good work
made good results which could be useful to others trying to defend against the same
adversary. To receive good information one needed to share good information, and
so started the large communities of cyber threat intelligence. The commercial value
of this type of work was quite fast seen by other environments, and the market
for threat intelligence grew very fast[3]. Today we are facing a severe amount of
businesses offering threat intelligence products.
Threat intelligence is evidence-based knowledge, including context, mechanisms,
indicators, implications and actionable advice, about an existing or emerging menace
or hazard to assets that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's
response to that menace or hazard[4]. In the world of cyber security, this means
sharing everything from smaller network artifacts, indicators of compromise and
samples of malware or infection vectors, to descriptions of how attackers are
operating, their capabilities and intents. In some cases also the identity of attackers
are shared. The format of sharing this type of information is going from emails,
files and chat-channels, to automatic feeds. The timing of such sharing is often very
important as much of the information shared is only valid for a limited amount of
time and can be crucial to receive in order to be able to handle whatever threat
is targeting you. More often than not is this type of sharing based on personal
1Oxford dictionary: 'Cyber threat: The possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt
a computer network or system.'
relationships. The choice of what to share and who to share it with is often a
decision made or at least initiated in the moment by the same personnel doing
incident response and threat hunting activities.
The information we gain when investigating an incident in a thorough manner
is knowledge, and knowledge management is a relatively young but evolved field of
research. In relation to knowledge and business ethics it is seen that an unwillingness
to share knowledge that may hurt an organization's survival is seen as being seriously
unethical[5]. In general, we could argue that the knowledge you have about an
adversary that may seriously injure another organization is something we are morally
obliged to share, but in our circumstances the decision to share may also give the
consequences of severely injuring your own ability to defend yourself against serious
consequences. The debate is therefore somewhat more complex in our circumstances.
We need to look at the general facts and circumstances that will influence the
choice of action when facing situations where sharing is an option.
The first aspects that will influence the decision you make is how knowledgeable
the receiver of your information or knowledge is. If organizational members believe
in other members' expertise and skills, the intention to share individual knowledge
increases[6]. Often the use of shared threat intelligence can ruin the information
itself, if the information you provide them is used in a manner the adversary is
capable of detecting. 'Blowing' the intelligence received is seen as likely if the
recipient has little knowledge or experience in both handling the technical details
as well as the stress related to a serious incident. The intent is seldom to ruin
the information when using it to defend yourself, but the possible consequences are
nevertheless there.
Secondly, also related to knowledge, is the ability for managers to understand
the consequences of sharing. Sharing is ultimately seen as a good deed, but
sometimes information shared is carrying metadata which can reveal more than
initially thought. This is something the technical personnel may try to explain
to their managers, but not knowing the business sides missing to understand the
consequences of and therefore not being able to explain in a sufficient way. The
uncertainty of not knowing how much is actually revealed with sharing a given set
of information, often influences the choice of sharing towards not sharing.
Thirdly, who can be affected by your decision is relevant, and how you are obliged
to them. Working for a company most always encounter a contract of work, making
you obliged to follow company policy and the instructions of your managers. Being
a citizen of a given country you are obliged by law to follow the rules set in that
country. As part of a volunteer community you are expected by your peers to
contribute, and you may even owe someone in the community or elsewhere a favor
after significant help in the past. In some cases you may be in a situation where
certain others seems to deserve help as they are either a special type of organization
or critical of nature, and the overall obligation to prevent bad behavior and criminal
acts as part of the society is always present.
From knowledge management we know that knowledge alliances motivate
managers to enter into strategic alliances with other firms in order to balance
knowledge deficiencies, obtain necessary competencies and create new knowledge[7].
This is exemplified by cyber threat intelligence and the vast amounts of sharing
and collaboration networks that exists. Some of these are based upon contracts
and legal obligations, like reporting to governmental parties when handling critical
infrastructure, and some are just based on spoken agreements and the desire to share
and collaborate like companies working in the same industry collaborating when it
is found useful. Either way the collaboration agreements you are faced with will
influence your choice of sharing information.
Fourthly, the culture of both the country, organization and community in which
you reside affects the willingness to share knowledge. Ethical decision-making is
affected by culture through an individual's deontological and teleological evaluations.
Although individuals may regard a particular activity as ethical, they may follow a
different course of action because of the desirable outcome. Because people make
different assumptions about personal knowledge, it can therefore not be assumed
that workers in all cultural value systems will view their own decision not to share
their personal knowledge, or a decision to act out of self-interest in the face of internal
competition, as unethical or immoral[6]. Within cyber threat intelligence, these
challenges can be exemplified with the differences between corporate organizations
and military organizations. Even though personnel from both have obligations
to their residing country, military personnel would arguably act from a stronger
obligation to national interests, simply because of their training, experience and
choice of work place. Consequently, their evaluation of consequences on national
security plays stronger than those of for example financial loss or personal gain.
Finally, timing is of importance. The nature of threat intelligence is that is most
often is only valid for a limited amount of time, and that the receiver needs it as
soon as possible to increase their ability to defend. An example is information on
the infrastructure used for attacking a given organization. An advanced attacker
would change the used infrastructure on a regular basis, leaving information on
IP addresses and domains useless as soon as they swap. In many cases this is a
matter of hours. Sometimes this means that there is not enough time to go all the
rounds internally to get approval before you share, and also that the time spent on
considering all consequences of the action could be a waste of time you do not have.
Whether you share classified information when sharing, or whether the attacker is
pushed to change its infrastructure sooner and leaves yourself unable to know where
the attack is coming from next, are considerations that requires time consuming
analysis. If conducting all analysis before sharing, the information may no longer be
worth sharing. In these terms it could be argued that following rules, adhering to
duties (deontological approach) is far better for the time sensitive matter of sharing
threat intelligence than that of considering consequences.
2 An example: sharing while enforcing your own
defense
A normal situation for a security analyst to be in is given as an example to illustrate
the challenges related to deciding who to share with. The described situation
illustrates the influencing factors relevant to the ethical consideration the analyst
must make.
Imagine the scenario: you are a young security analyst, skilled and with
experience from several organizations, both work related and as part of the volunteer
security community. You are popular both because you are knowledgeable, but
also because you on several occasions have helped others in succeeding with
handling difficult incidents in the past. You are active within several cyber security
communities on your spare time.
At work, you take place in the handling of a severe security incident. An
adversary has successfully compromised your computer network, but you have
detected the attacker and are monitoring their every move together with your team.
You do not know for sure what the adversary is after, but based on the business
of which your company is working, you have a fair idea. If your suspicion is right,
the adversary in question would be able to do severe physical damage through your
computer systems if not stopped. You have several friends in organizations likely to
be targeted by the same adversary, both private and public sector, and the adversary
is likely to be after valuables of national interests and capable of sabotaging critical
infrastructure. You also know enough about the adversary to conclude it is an
advanced attacker with the ability to change its behavior to the extent that you are
no longer able to either detect or monitor them anymore. Hence you are depending
on your knowledge not to be leaked to the adversary in any way to be sure you
can defend against them yourself. You prepare information on how to detect and
monitor the adversary for sharing with others and approach your manager. The
discussion that follows is difficult: Should we share this information? And with
whom? Who are we obliged to help and to what extent can we morally defend
putting our own defense before others? Is personal obligations something you can
set aside or is that relevant as well?
There are technical and practical aspects that we set aside for this discussion,
like the ability to share the information in a relevant manner. For our purposed
we are looking into the ethical aspects of the decision of sharing/not sharing with
different parties.
To debate what is morally right and wrong in our example we need to examine
the possible actions and related rules (deontological approach), and the consequences
of our possible actions, both the direct consequences and the long term consequences
(teleological approach, in this case consequentialism).
So the possible choices to make regarding our piece of information in this
situation are the following:
 Doing nothing. A general, positive rule is that 'we share information that
can help others'. In these terms the act of not sharing information is unethical.
However, if sharing that information encounters possibly sharing metadata
covered by laws and regulations in the county in question, you are breaking
a more prominent rule of 'do not break national laws'. However, if skilled
at incident response you know what information that is ok to share, and the
deontological approach would tell you that the act of not sharing is unethical.
The consequences of not sharing information is directly that you do not spend
time on it, which may help you do better at actual defense. In addition, you
are certain that you keep all company information safe. On the negative side
you find several consequences, but the worst would be that several others are
not able to defend themselves and that it could lead to severe physical damage.
With this as considerations it is not ethically possible to defend not sharing
information with anyone. I consider the action of 'waiting and sharing later'
to give the same discussion as above.
 Sharing information with national capabilities only. In Norway (and
most countries with defined national cyber capabilities) there are laws and
regulations stating that incidents which can affect national security shall be
reported to the authorities. This means that handling an incident in your
environment if your environment is part of for example critical infrastructure,
is something that should be reported as soon as the incident has been detected.
The decision of not helping anyone else does however mean you do break the
rule of 'we share information that can help others' as stated above.
Company policies are usually having statements in lines of 'we shall always
adhere to laws and regulations, but any circumstances where we suspect
possible prosecution as a consequence shall be run by legal'. In the time
sensitive circumstances of incident response, this often means you need to
break either company or national laws when deciding. Most companies will
officially state that national laws are first in line, but in real world scenarios
we see that this is not always as straight forward. If considering our society it
is hard to argue that not sharing with national capabilities is morally right.
If evaluating consequences the most prominent positive are that they can
protect our national interest. They can decide on further sharing, which for
many means you have done your duty. But knowing the authorities does not
have the same network as yourself, you know that not everyone you could have
helped is being helped. This is still breaking your obligations to the society and
the security community and still many organizations being defenseless must
be seen as a negative consequence still. Further, on negative side of actually
sharing with the authorities, is the uncertainty of how well they will treat
the information you provide them with. Their interests and their skill level is
probably unknown to you, and you risk them ruining your own defense. The
information you provide can put you in a position where they will investigate
you further, and also, you risk that they will classify your information which
makes it harder for you to use in the further.
Sharing with the authorities is seldom argued immoral due to the laws and
their ability to help national interests, but not sharing with others may be
defended as unethical.
 Sharing information with those you know. The situation where people
that are close to you get hurt is harder to accept. The rule of helping others
is strengthened, but will only survive as long as laws or regulations are not
forbidding you to share information. Seeing you know those close to you,
your evaluation of skill level is related to less uncertainty, which decreases the
negative consequences of sharing with them. Breaking laws to share would
encounter prosecution and would not be considered ethical if lives are not at
stake. Following both deontological and teleological approaches will therefore
likely give the same conclusion: you should share as long as the recipients are
allowed to by law.
 Sharing information with the relevant sectors. Within the security
industry several sharing collaborations has been created in order to share
with relevant partners in different incidents. The groups are often created
in different industry sectors and based on voluntary participation. It can be
seen as closed sharing with participation restrictions, but without personal
knowledge of the group of recipients, their skill level and where their loyalty
lies.
In our example we have a situation where the analyst is not obliged by rule
or formal contract to share. The rule of sharing information to help others is
still present and I can find no other rule that is strong enough to contradict
this. However, looking at the possible consequences of sharing you have larger
degree of uncertainty related to how the information is being treated and
therefore you have potential consequences ruining the information not only
for you, but also for national capabilities and others you have shared with.
Given this evaluation I find it to be defendable to limit the amount of sharing
done to those you know can help the most and maybe can assume can handle
the information best.
 Sharing information with everyone. The act of sharing information with
everyone is good alone. It follows the rule of 'you are not keeping to yourself
information that can be valuable to someone else'. Seeing it is impossible for
you to know everyone who can gain value out of the information you share,
broadcasting the information in ways that makes everyone interested capable
of finding it is therefore the right way to go. Technically, this means creating a
public report or similar and publishing it somewhere online. However, sharing
with everyone also means sharing with your adversaries, and knowing this
breaks the unwritten rule of 'not telling your enemies how you work or what
you know'. Which rule is the most prominent of these? The uncertainty of
the latter and the size of the benefit it serves other victims will judge this.
Following the consequences of these actions, one can argue that the good
of sharing with everyone is both that more people may be able to protect
themselves, but also that by sharing intelligence more people can learn and
the general skill level is increased. The flip side is as indicated earlier, the
adversaries may change their patterns, improve and be even harder to protect
against in the future[8].
In these terms the 'doctrine of double effect' comes into relevance. If sharing
the information with everybody, then it is likely that everyone will benefit in
the short run, but the advanced communities will lose eyes on the adversary as
soon at the adversary knows their details are known. This is known, but the
good of more organizations being able to defend themselves in the short run,
outweighs the fact that the adversary is able to escape detection by changing
the details now known in the broader communities. This is seen as ethically
defendable as long as the intention is that of helping more organization
defending themselves, and not to help the adversaries in improving their
methods.
3 Sharing information about past cyber incidents
Another relevant question concerns sharing information about a cyber-threat in
the aftermath of an incident. This can still contain valuable information about
an adversary, but often not technical information that can be of direct help to a
certain incident. IP addresses are no longer in use by the adversary, but they still
use the same procedures when attacking a new victim. Even though the technical
details may be ruined and useless, information about cyber threat methodology stays
robust over time and may be shared in the aftermaths of an incident to contribute
to the base of experience the rest of the security communities can benefit from. The
information can therefore not be ruined by recipients that lacks sufficient knowledge.
Also, to share information is often a decision made by others than the personnel
themselves, for example marketing or legal, but is still an interesting and related
debate to address. The consequences of such an action is less influenced by that of
'ruining information' and hence not as related to the knowledge of the recipients,
but more so of the long term consequences of the community we live in. Sharing
knowledge between defending parties makes our community better prepared and
more likely able to protect its citizens. The conclusions made within knowledge
management theory[5] is therefore more valid here, and it is possible to state that
not sharing such knowledge is considered unethical.
4 Conclusions
The position you are in/the context will always influence the decision you make and
also the difficulties of acting morally right. The most prominent aspects influencing
the decision of sharing threat intelligence is who you are obliged to, who can be
affected by your decision and how much damage the information can have among
the wrong recipients. In our cyber security world we see that both employer and
friends in the security community have high influence. Trust in and skillset of the
recipients is of high importance when evaluating the possible consequences. When
sharing sensitive information one needs to trust the recipient to protect it from the
adversaries and not to ruin it. Sharing information itself is a good deed, but if the
negative consequences are easily understood, then the decision not to share is the
easiest. The ethical challenges of acting against laws and regulations seems to be the
strongest positive influence on the choice of sharing information, which may come
as a result of the little analysis needed to understand the consequence. The extent
of both negative and positive consequences of sharing cyber threat intelligence is
otherwise requiring more extensive analysis and may not be possible to even estimate
due to time constraints and lack of available knowledge. Your assumed adversary
may be able to severely damage your organization and your peers may be able to
both use the received information and treat it with care. When uncertain people
often has a tendency not to act.
Creating a given rule to follow in any such case is impossible due to the large
degree of uncertainty in the above stated aspects influencing the choice of action. A
solely deontological approach is therefore not a suitable ethical framework to deal
with such cases.
As part of a society the long term consequences of not sharing information at
all is making the act immoral. With the knowledge of severe negative consequences
of sharing a piece of information, the sharing can defendable be done within closed
communities where the recipients are known to treat the information right, like
sector specific sharing groups or sharing with groups consisting of members based
on 'invite only'. However, in the aftermath of an incident, when the incident has been
handled, I can see no good argumentation to defend the act of not sharing valuable
threat intelligence. The consequences of not sharing information or revealing real
incidents will in the long run mean that less people understand the severity of the
cyber-attacks in our region, and consequently do not spend resources protecting
against them. For us as a society that is a major security issue.
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